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INTRODUCTION
It is common  for law professors to divide scholarship  on a given  subject
into  opposing  methodological  camps.  In  tort,  the  most  familiar  divide
today  is that between the law-and-economics  camp that focuses on efficient
deterrence,  and  the  philosophical  camp  that tends  to  focus  on  corrective
justice.  There  is  another  divide,  however,  that  is at  least  as  fundamental
and that cuts across this distinction.  It is between duty-skeptical  and duty-
accepting  theories  of tort.'  A  familiar  instantiation  of this  cleavage  is  the
long-standing  debate concerning  the  independence  and intelligibility of the
duty element of the negligence cause of action.2  But this debate  is part of a
broader dispute as to whether tort law is best conceptualized as  a scheme of
liability rules or guidance rules.3
On the liability-rule  view, tort law  sets standards  for when one person or
entity  can  be  ordered  by  a  judge  to  bear  the  losses  of  another.  The
justifications  identified for this loss  reallocation  vary:  Efficiency,  fairness,
and other considerations  might be invoked.  Yet in all its variants, liability-
rule tort theory  embraces the notion that tort is about  allocating losses and
concomitantly  rejects the idea that the payment of damages  in a tort  case is
an  instance  of an  injurer  being  held  to  account  for  having  breached  an
obligation to conduct herself in certain ways  toward the victim.  The  latter
idea, by contrast, is at the core of guidance-rule  conceptions of tort.  On this
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Vanderbilt Law School.
**  Professor  and James H.  Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham  University School  of Law.
1.  See Nicholas  J. McBride,  Duties of Care-Do They Really Exist?, 24 O.J.L.S.  417
(2004).  McBride  describes  the divide  as  between  "cynics"  and  "idealists."  Id. at  418-19.
We refrain  from adopting  his terminology  in part because,  in our view, the  label "idealists"
only  aids  duty  skepticism  by  linking  duty  acceptance  to  overly  moralistic,  squishy,  and
esoteric  ways of thinking.  Likewise,  we  have qualms  about  defining  the  issue  at hand  as
whether duties "really exist," given that this sort of locution  tends to link  duty acceptance  to
strong metaphysical  claims about which duty skeptics are justifiably skeptical.
2.  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,  The Moral of MacPherson,  146 U.
Pa. L.  Rev.  1733,  1745-66,  1799-1846 (1998)  (discussing  and responding  to duty  skeptics'
deconstruction of the duty element of negligence).
3.  See generally Dale  A. Nance,  Guidance Rules  and Enforcement Rules:  A  Better
View of the Cathedral,  83  Va. L.  Rev.  837  (1997)  (contrasting  liability-rule  and guidance-
rule conceptions  of law).
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understanding, tort  is  a collection  of "dos"  and "don'ts":  It mandates how
we are  obligated  to  act with regard  to the  interests  of others  and provides
persons who are victimized by breaches  of these obligations with the ability
to obtain  satisfaction,  through law,  for having been mistreated.  Although
guidance-rule  conceptions  of  tort  lend  themselves  naturally  to  certain
rights-based accounts of tort law, they are not limited to such accounts.  For
example,  a  "post-Chicago-School"  economist  who  takes  social  norms
seriously can adopt a guidance-rule conception  of tort law that nonetheless
maintains  that  efficient  deterrence  is  the ultimate justification  for having
such rules.
4
In elaborating  this divide within the world of tort scholarship,  this essay
develops  three  main  points.  First,  it  argues  that,  as  represented  by  the
groundbreaking work of Holmes,5 liability-rule,  duty-skeptical  accounts  of
tort  tend  to  be  fueled  by  an  understandable  but  nonetheless  excessive
reaction to a naively moralistic  version of what it means for tort law to be a
law  of genuine  duties.  Second,  it  argues  that,  overwhelmingly,  modem
mainstream  American  tort  scholarship  is  "Holmesian"  in  embracing  duty
skepticism  and  the  implications  of that  skepticism.  Third,  it  claims  that
H.L.A.  Hart's  celebrated  critique  of  Holmes's  jurisprudential
deconstruction  of legal duties-particularly  Hart's  account of the "internal
aspect"  of rules-provides  a  duty-accepting  jurisprudence  that  is  more
satisfactory  than  its  duty-skeptical  counterparts,  yet  still  sensitive  to
skeptics'  legitimate worries about naive accounts of legal duties. 6  In short,
Hart's  critique  of  Holmes  and  his  resuscitation  of the  notion  of legal
obligation  undercuts  much of the impetus  for duty  skepticism  in tort,  and
conversely  provides  a  basis  for  duty-accepting,  guidance-rule  theories  of
tort.
I.  HOLMES'S GAMBIT:  REDEFINING DUTY  AND REINVENTING  TORT LAW
A.  Setting the Stage
Holmes is justly famous for being among the first to construct a theory  of
tort  law  that  self-consciously  attempts  to  account  for  the  central  place  in
modem  tort  law  of  accidents  causing  physical  injury.7  He  is  equally
4.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter,  The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law:  Economic  Analysis
of  the Internal Viewpoint, 75 Fordham L. Rev.  1275  (2006).
5.  See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,  The Common Law (Little, Brown, & Co.
1945)  (1881)  [hereinafter Holmes, The Common Law]; Oliver Wendell Holmes,  The Path of
the Law,  10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897)  [hereinafter Holmes, Path of  the Law].
6.  See generally H.L.A.  Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994).  Hart, of course,  self-
identified  as  a  legal  positivist  who  was  attempting  to  improve  upon  what he  took  to  be
cruder versions  of positivism  offered  by  the  likes  of Austin  and  Holmes.  For what  it  is
worth, we do not think of ourselves as positivists,  in part because  we do not believe  that one
needs to subscribe to legal positivism  in order to  treat law as  a partly autonomous realm  of
powers,  rights, privileges,  and duties.
7.  See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev.  1225 (2001).
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famous  for  articulating  a  vigorously  amoralistic  conception  of  law
personified  by the figure of the "bad man."'8  That Holmes jointly pursued
these two projects  (among others) is a testament to his intellectual  ambition
and virtuosity,  for the received thinking about law generally, and tort  law in
particular, was inhospitable  to his theoretical ambitions.
First,  tort  and  its  historical  antecedents  were  (as  tort  still  is)  rife  with
concepts  that  link  it  to notions  of morality.  The  medieval  progenitor  of
tort-the older notion of a "trespass"-linked  tort to biblical notions of sin
and  transgression. 9  Later  writers  including  John  Locke  and  William
Blackstone  had categorized actions brought under these writs as comprising
the  category  of "private  wrongs."10  A doctor  who  provided incompetent
medical  services  to his patient,  in the process  causing  her harm, is a  doctor
who,  under the  law of the  writ system, had  committed  against  his patient
the private wrong of malpractice.
Second, the trespass or tort actions of Holmes's day purported  to  be (as
tort actions still purport to be) fundamentally  about obligatory  conduct.  As
the  malpractice  example  suggests,  tort verdicts,  judgments,  and  opinions
have long contained (and continue to contain) words and phrases that, when
taken  at face  value,  offer prescriptions  as  to how one  must conduct oneself
in relation to certain facets of others'  well-being.  These facets of individual
well-being were  linked  by pre-Holmesian  writers  to core  individual rights,
such  as  the right  to  bodily  integrity,  the  right  to  liberty,  the  right  to  own
property,  and  the right to one's good name. II  Thus,  a trespass action  for
battery  was  described  as  vindicating  the  right  to  bodily  integrity  by
proscribing  a purposeful  touching of one by another,  at least absent  indicia
of permission.  Likewise,  cases  that would today  fall  under the heading of
negligence  instructed  that  one  must  act  with  reasonable  care  for  the
physical  well-being  of certain  others.  Defamation  cases  specified  that  a
person  must  not  publish  statements  about  another  of a  sort  that  tends  to
injure another's good name.  Nuisance cases  indicated that one  is ordinarily
obligated  not  to  use  one's  own  property  in  a  manner  that  generates  an
ongoing  and  unreasonable  interference  with  another's  enjoyment  of his
property.  In  sum,  the  law  of  torts  was  understood  by  the  likes  of
Blackstone  to house directives  that are rooted  in basic rights and that give
rise  to  relational  legal  duties  specifying  various  ways  in  which  one  is
actually obligated to behave toward others in light of others'  basic interests.
They further understood tort causes of actions for damages as recognition in
law of the right holder's entitlement to have  recourse against a person who
8.  See generally The Path of the Law and Its Influence:  The Legacy of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. (Steven  J. Burton  ed., 2000)  (essays on Holmes's jurisprudence).
9.  See  John  C.P.  Goldberg,  Anthony  J.  Sebok & Benjamin  C.  Zipursky,  Tort Law:
Responsibilities  and Redress, at app. A (2004).
10.  See John  C.P.  Goldberg,  The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process and
the Right to  a  Law for the Redress of Wrongs,  115  Yale  L.J.  524,  531-59  (2005).  Private
wrongs were also referred to as "civil  injuries,"  where the term  "injuries"  was understood  to
refer to mistreatments or wrongings, as opposed simply to setbacks or losses. Id. at 542-43.
11.  Id.  at 545-51.
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has  done him  wrong. 12  In  other words,  the  plaintiffs  membership  in  the
class of beneficiaries  to whom  the defendant's  duty was  owed  earned the
plaintiff  standing  to  complain  when  the  defendant  engaged  in  conduct
constituting a breach of that duty.
Third,  tort  law  was  (as  it  still  is)  primarily  common  law.  The
prescriptions  that  it  issues  were  not  to  be  found  in  a  code  of  conduct
comparable  to  the  official  rulebook  of a  sport.  Instead,  they  had  to  be
teased  out  of judicial  opinions  that  at  times  sent  subtle  or  ambiguous
messages  about  exactly  how  one was  supposed  to behave  toward  others.
These  rules,  moreover,  changed  over  time,  sometimes  incrementally,
sometimes  abruptly,  and  often  without  the  sort  of  notice  or  buildup
associated  with legislation  or regulation.  Yet they  also  purported  in  some
way to track custom-prevailing practices, norms, and sensibilities.
These three features of the  law of private  wrongs ran headlong into what
turn  out  to  be  three  of  the  main  props  of  Holmes's  approach  to
jurisprudence  and tort law.  Indeed, Holmes seems to have  developed them
in  reaction  to  those  features.  The  first  was  his  insistence  on  the
distinctiveness  of legal  and  moral  concepts. 13  The  second was  Holmes's
claim that an actor's being under a legal duty means  only that, if the actor
behaves  in  certain  ways,  he  faces  the possibility  of being  subjected  by  a
judge  (qua agent of the state)  to "disagreeable  consequences.' 14  The third
was  his abiding  concern  that  modern  law  give  clear  notice  to  persons  of
their  prospects  for  being  made  to  suffer  such  consequences. 15  It  is  a
measure of Holmes's confidence  and success that, in each of these respects,
he  attacked  conventional  thinking  about  tort  law  head-on  and,  in  the
process, turned academic thinking about law on its head.
Our claim  in this part is that this project was at once well motivated and
poorly executed.  Holmes deserves credit for launching  a campaign to drive
a wedge between  moral wrongs  and legal wrongs in law  generally and tort
particularly.  Regrettably,  however,  his  strategy  for carrying  it out was to
insist,  unnecessarily  and  problematically,  on  collapsing  the  idea  of legal
duty into the idea of threat of sanction.
B.  Holmes on Torts
In taking  on the  challenges  we  have described,  Holmes  had  assistance
from  John  Austin  (and  perhaps  Jeremy  Bentham  as  well).16  As  noted
above,  one  way  to  understand  how  writers  like Blackstone  thought about
12.  Id.
13.  See Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 5, at 459.
14.  Id. at 461.
15.  Id. at 94-95,  111  (emphasizing  that tort law must give notice  and the opportunity  for
choice to those subject to it).
16.  1 John  Austin,  Lectures  on Jurisprudence  §§  577-95,  at  278-84  (Robert  Campbell
ed., London, John Murray 3d ed.  1869)  (1861).  The ensuing account of Austin and Holmes
draws  from  John  C.P.  Goldberg,  Two  Conceptions of Tort' Damages:  Fair v.  Full
Compensation,  55 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 463-65 (2006).
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tort is to start with an account of individual rights, derive from that account
a  set of relational  duties  the  breach  of which  constitutes private  wrongs,
then  further derive  the  idea  of a private  right of action-a power  to  seek
recourse  through  law  that  belongs  to the  right holder  whose  rights  have
been violated by the doing of the wrong.  In his desire to recast positive law
in  terms  of sovereign  commands,  Austin inverted  this  model  by  starting
with  the  fact  of the  law's  having  authorized  suits  for  damages,  then
reasoning  from  there to the character  of the claims  being brought.  In  his
view,  it  is  only  because  the  English  sovereign  had  chosen  to  enact  laws
authorizing persons to bring private suits for damages in response  to others'
conduct  that  the  Blackstonian  category  of  private  wrongs-and  the
relational  duties  underlying  them-had  come  into  existence.  Thus,  to
Austin,  tort  law  was  not  about  judges  and  juries  giving  expression  to
conventional  understandings  of rights and  wrongs,  nor  about giving legal
expression  to  some  sort  of  pre-legal  right  to  recourse  against  one's
wrongdoers.  Rather,  it was  about the  sovereign  issuing  a  special  kind of
command  granting  to  certain  persons  a positive-law  power  to  sue  under
certain conditions, and only thereby creating  a set of relational  legal  duties
that actors  who might be  subject  to suit were bound to observe  on pain  of
sanction at the request of their victims.
Austin's top-down,  remedy-driven conception of torts went hand in hand
with  a reconceptualization  of the  main purpose  of tort actions.  Although
Austin conceded that the immediate purpose of a tort  suit was to empower
the  victim  to  obtain  redress,  he  also  insisted  that  this  fact  was  not
dispositive for the characterization  of this body of law.  Once we recognize
that tort rights of action exist  only because  of the  sovereign's  decision to
arm people  with the power to sue others, we can ask why the sovereign  has
chosen  to  arm  them.  Austin  concluded  that the  provision  of tort actions
stemmed  from the sovereign's  interest in  deterring  immoral  conduct.  The
"paramount"  point of a private right of action, he concluded,  "like that of a
criminal sanction[,]  is the prevention of offenses generally."'17
Starting  in  the  1870s,  Holmes  developed  and  significantly  revised
Austin's approach.  Like Austin, Holmes  characterized  tort as imposed on
citizens  by  the  state  (through  its  judges),  rather  than  built  up  from  a
foundation  of  rights  embodied  in  Anglo-American  social  norms  and
practices. 18  Unlike  Austin,  however,  Holmes  argued  that  this  regime  of
private  suits had nothing  to  do with breaches  of relational  duties  owed by
one  person  to  others,  and  indeed  nothing  at  all to  do  with  duties  or the
ought-ness  associated  with  rules  describing  acceptable  and  unacceptable
behavior.19
17.  See  1 Austin, supra note  16, § 722, at 360.
18.  See  Goldberg  &  Zipursky,  supra  note  2,  at  1752-56  (discussing  Holmes's
conception of tort duties).
19.  See Holmes, The Common Law, supra  note  5,  at 144 ("[T]he general purpose of the
law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation,
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First, Holmes insisted,  the duties in tort  law are not, in the end,  genuine
duties.  In this respect, Holmes's thinking about tort law went hand in hand
with his thinking about jurisprudence.  As Holmes famously argued in  The
Path of the Law, a client who asks his lawyer to inform him of the content
of his  legal  duties  is  not  asking  for advice  on  what  he  ought  to  do,  if
"ought"  is  used  in  a  moral  sense.  He  is,  instead,  seeking  a  reliable
prediction  about  the  sort  of conduct  that  will  or  will  not  expose  him  to
court-ordered sanction.  Because this is  what is  meant by "legal  duty,"  and
because this is what one who  is knowledgeable  about law would understand
assertions  about  legal  duties to  mean, legal  duties turn out,  on inspection,
not to be duties after all.  Moreover, thought Holmes, the supposed duties of
tort law  are quite plainly not  attached to the  sort of "forbidding"  that goes
along with moral  duties.  If in  recognizing the  cause  of action for battery,
tort law really meant to say that one  is duty-bound to refrain from touching
others  absent permission,  then  it would  have  attached  a  different kind  of
consequence  to  such  actions,  rather  than merely  requiring  the batterer  to
pay for the privilege of touching.20
Second, Holmes  argued, even if one  insists on speaking  euphemistically
of the "duties"  generated by tort law, those duties are properly described as
non-relational  rather  than  relational.  These  "duties"  are  created  by  the
state,  and owed to the state.  The  fact that a private  citizen would typically
end  up  being  a  beneficiary  of them  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  they  are
imposed and underwritten  by courts-state  actors.21  To say that a cause  of
action  for  negligence  requires  the  plaintiff  to  establish  that  a  defendant
breached  a duty  owed to  her,  or persons  such  as  her,  is thus  to  describe
erroneously  the  form of the  rules of tort law.  What tort law  really says  is
that a person can avoid risking  sanction  by acting reasonably,  full stop  (as
opposed to reasonably  with respect to one or another class of persons).
Third,  Austin,  no  less  than  Blackstone,  earned  Holmes's  disdain  for
relying  on  the  hidebound  and  moralistic  supposition  that  the  law  of a
modern  liberal  state  would  or should  give  expression,  even indirectly,  to
primitive notions of blaming,  retaliating, and punishing.22  With the arrival
of the industrial revolution  and  modern,  secular, atomistic  society,  tort law
was no longer Blackstone's eclectic  gallery of private  wrongs, but instead a
law of accidents.  As  such, it was  decreasingly  concerned  with the sort  of
conduct  that  could  plausibly  be  described  as  being  worthy  of  state
regulation on the ground of being "wrongful."  (Hence  it was no "accident"
that, under the objective standard of reasonableness,  moral blameworthiness
in  a  full-blooded  sense  was  not  a  formal  condition  of  liability  for
negligence.)  Indeed, modern law, Holmes supposed, had so far moved past
these concerns that not only tort law, but even criminal  law, was coalescing
or estate,  at the  hands of his  neighbors, not because  they  are wrong, but because  they  are
harms."); see also id. at  149.
20.  See Holmes, Path of  the Law, supra  note 5,  at 462.
21.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2,  at 1756.
22.  Holmes, The Common Law, supra note  5, at 81-82.
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around  a  liability  standard  that  rendered  genuine  culpability  irrelevant.
Liability  instead was  triggered whenever  a person  in  a position to foresee
that his conduct might  cause harm  to another  failed to take  steps  to  guard
against  that  harm. 23   That  both  criminal  and  tort  law  deployed  this
"objective"  standard of reasonableness-one  that does not track notions  of
moral blame24-confirmed  for  Holmes  that  the  state's reasons  for issuing
sanctions  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  wrongfulness  of a  citizen's  acts.
Instead,  the  modern,  liberal  state  was  using  law  to  draw  the  boundary
between  acts  one  is  at liberty  to  undertake  without  risk  of state-imposed
adverse consequences  and acts for which one runs that risk.25  This, in turn,
would  give  people  room  to  act  and  permit  them,  with  the  help  of their
Holmesian  lawyer-predictors,  to  order  their  affairs  and  make  rational
decisions about how to go about their lives given their preferences.
But  if, in Holmes's view,  criminal and tort law  were  concerned to  draw
the same liability line, what was the point of the common law's having kept
the two categories distinct?  Austin, following Blackstone, had an answer to
this  question,  one that  focused on  the  real  party in  interest  (i.e.,  a private
citizen  in  a tort suit,  as opposed  to  the public  in  a  criminal prosecution).
That option, however, was not available to Holmes, because  he rejected the
idea that there was a distinction to be drawn between  relational and absolute
duties, and hence had no reason to locate the unique character of tort law in
the fact that  it empowered private  citizens  to sue  in their own right, rather
than empowering  them to sue on behalf of the public  or empowering public
officials to prosecute.26  Instead of focusing on the identity of the real party
in  interest,  Holmes  looked  to  the  character and purpose of the  state-
imposed penalty that attached  to unreasonable  conduct  in these two  classes
of  legal  proceedings.  In  criminal  cases,  judges  ordered  fines  and
imprisonment  out  of  a  concern  for  "prevention"-albeit  prevention  of
harms, not (as Austin had supposed) prevention of the commission of moral
wrongs.27  By  contrast,  in  tort  cases,  the  government,  through  its  courts,
ordered  actors  who  had  exceeded  the sphere  of liberty granted  to them by
the  law to bear losses incurred  by others  as  a result of their having taken
liberties.  In  short,  what warranted  treating  tort law  as  a department  in its
own right was that  it tells citizens when they will have to indemnify others:
23.  Id. at  53.  Holmes sometimes  backed  off the  strongest  versions of this claim.  He
acknowledged,  for example,  that tort law sometimes treats  the presence or absence of certain
subjective mental  states such as  "malice" as critical to the determination of whether an  actor
will be sanctioned. See Oliver Wendell Holmes,  Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L.
Rev.  1, 2 (1894).  Despite  relenting on the idea that the entire common  law had settled  on a
single  liability  standard,  Holmes  clung  to  the  notion  that  one  could  see  in  tort  law  a
"tendency"  toward  the realization  of a "general theory"  of liability for acts that cause  harm
under circumstances  where  the risk of harm was or should  have been manifest  to the actor.
Holmes, Path of  the Law, supra  note 5,  at 471.
24.  Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 5, at  107-09.
25.  Id. at 79.
26.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 1756.
27.  Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 5, at 46.
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"The  business of the  law of torts  is to fix the dividing lines  between those
cases  in  which  a  man  is liable  for harm  which  he  has  done, and  those  in
which he  is not."'28  Tort,  in  this view,  is  a  law of liability  rules  set up to
provide  compensation  to those  who  suffer  certain  undeserved  setbacks. 29
This  is why Holmes  saw the central  task for judges faced with tort suits to
be  clarifying  what  does  or  does  not  count  as  reasonable  conduct  in
particular  contexts.  By  issuing  matter-of-law  rulings,  judges  would
eventually  supplant  the "featureless  generality"  of the  reasonable  person
standard30  with  a  judge-made  code  of per  se  rules  of  reasonable  and
unreasonable  conduct  that  would  give  citizens  clear  notice  of when  they
could expect to be ordered to pay compensation to another person.  Citizens
could then decide for themselves whether to risk incurring that expense.
C. Holmes's Legacy in Torts
Holmes's  approach  to  tort  law,  legal  duties,  and  law  provided  the
launching  pad  for mainstream  modem  tort scholarship.  To  some  extent,
however, his  influence has  been masked because  later theorists have  taken
Holmes's work in at least two directions that Holmes himself did not.  First,
many leading tort scholars have ironically 3'  linked Holmes's thinking about
jurisprudence and tort law to a progressive political  agenda.32  That is,  they
saw  and have  seen  in Holmes's  duty skepticism  a  basis for liberating  tort
law  from  what  they  perceived  to  be  its  historical  commitment  to  the
protection of owners of property  and capital over the interests  of individual
workers  and  consumers.  Tort  law,  shom  of its  moralistic  veneer,  was
revealed  to  be  a  regulatory  regime  that could  and  should  be  changed  to
better track  the  political  commitments  of the  emerging  (later  established)
welfare  state.
28.  Id.  at 79; see also id.  at 96, 144.
29.  It  is possible  that, by  making tortfeasors indemnify  victims,  the state  would  reduce
the  incidence  of tortious  conduct.  But  Holmes  did  not explain  or defend tort  law  as  an
incentive  scheme  of this  sort.  Rather,  he  treated  it  as  a  system  for  allocating  losses  as
between  an  innocent  victim and an actor who had taken more  than his  fair share of liberty
(where "fairness"  was determined by the  standards of conduct set out by judicial decisions in
negligence cases).
30.  See id. at  111.
31.  This  is  ironic  because  Holmes  himself  did  not  link  his  thoughts  on  law  to
progressivism. See Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values:  The Life, Work, and Legacy
of Justice  Holmes  19-30 (2000) (emphasizing "Nietzschean"  aspects  of Holmes's thought);
Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American  law 48-49 (1977)  (arguing  that the image of Holmes
as a progressive, sometimes associated with his Lochner dissent, is  false).
32.  See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune and  Just Compensation:  Weinstein
on Torts, 97  Colum. L. Rev.  2034, 2045-49  (1997)  (discussing  how Fleming James  adopted
and  inverted  Holmesian  tort  theory);  Goldberg  &  Zipursky,  supra note  2,  at  1756-66
(describing  Prosser's  elaboration  of Holmes's  framework).  That  later  Holmesians  were
more politically progressive  explains why they, and not Holmes,  were keen to disparage  the
older conception  of tort as a  law of wrongs on  political as  well  as jurisprudential  grounds.
Specifically,  they, unlike Holmes,  saw an unholy connection  between  conceiving  of tort law
as a law of private wrongs  and  laissez-faire politics. See, e.g.,  Goldberg  & Zipursky,  supra
note 2, at 1760-61.
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Second and relatedly, regardless of their political  stripes, Holmesian tort
scholars  have  been  more  accepting  of  having  judges  function  as  self-
conscious, aggressive  law reformers. 33  In their  view, judges are presumed
to have substantial leeway to change the contours of tort liability in light of
"policy"  considerations. 34  Whereas  Holmes  saw  the  primary  task  for
judges  to  be  that of reducing  the  reasonable person  standard  to relatively
clear  liability  rules,  later  Holmesians  have  described  and  generally
approved  of judges  using  the  jurisdictional  hooks  provided  by  elusive
concepts  like "duty"  and  "proximate  cause"  to craft  liability  rules that are
most  likely  to  achieve  desired  results  such  as  deterrence  of  antisocial
conduct or compensation of the injured. 35
Despite  the  undeniable  importance  of these  developments,  they  in  no
way detract from our basic point, which is that Holmes, by linking a radical
jurisprudential  argument  to  a  radical  reconceptualization  of  tort  law,
changed  the  landscape  of tort  theory.  With  some  prominent  exceptions,
33.  On  Holmes's  relatively  narrow,  formalistic  conception  of  the  judge's  role,  see
Thomas  C.  Grey,  Molecular Motions:  The  Hoimesian Judge in  Theory and Practice,  37
Wm. &  Mary L. Rev.  19, 28,  32 (1995).
34.  See Goldberg  & Zipursky, supra note 2, at  1762-66 (describing Prosser's conception
of judicial reasoning  about duty questions  as policy making).  Holmes  was not unaware  or
disapproving of this conception of the judicial role, but he seems to have been of the view-
surely  common  in his time-that judges could  not (and perhaps  should not) be expected  to
operate  self-consciously  as  policy  makers.  See  Holmes,  supra note  23,  at  3  (noting  that
judges invoke policy considerations  to limit liability but are reluctant to admit they are doing
so).  With  the  subsequent  rise  of the  administrative  state  and,  still  later,  Warren  Court
conceptions  of public-law  adjudication,  Holmesian  scholars,  many  of whom  were  or  are
more  sympathetic  to  expansive  government  regulation  than  was  Holmes  himself,  have
tended  to  cast  courts  on  the  model  of mini-legislatures  or  agencies.  Of course,  they
conceded that courts suffer from significant drawbacks  as  lawmakers.  Most obviously,  they
are  not able  to  engage  in de  novo  legislation  or formal  rulemaking,  nor  can they  act  sua
sponte  or purely prospectively.  Instead,  they  are ordinarily limited to  ordering a person or
entity (or small group) to pay another person or entity (or other persons and entities) in light
of past actions.  Given these  limits on the power delegated to courts,  later Holmesians  have
supposed  that  the  most plausible  "regulatory"  assignment  government  can  give  to  courts
presiding over tort cases  is  that of contributing  to the  deterrence  of undesirable  (antisocial)
conduct and/or to the compensation of persons who have suffered undeserved  losses.  In this
view, courts might  be thought of as "ministries  for  deterrence  and compensation,"  with  tort
plaintiffs  cast  as  "bounty  hunters"  who  are authorized  to  sue  by  the law  in  the  service  of
these policy  goals.  John  C.P. Goldberg,  Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91  Geo. L.J.  513,
522-29 (2003)  (describing  basic tenets of Holmesian compensation-deterrence  theory).
35.  See Goldberg &  Zipursky, supra note 2,  at  1762-66.  Although Holmes was keen to
apply  cynical  acid  to  the  concepts  of  legal  right  and  legal  duty,  his  cynicism  was  in
retrospect  rather  selective.  (Is  this  not  always  the  case  when  cynics  are  viewed  in
hindsight?)  In  particular, he  seemed  quite  prepared  to take  at  face value concepts  such  as
foreseeability,  reasonableness,  and  causation  that  later  Holmesians  have  sought  to
deconstruct on  terms comparable  to his deconstruction  of right and  duty.  For example,  no
less mainstream a source than the American Law Institute now tells us that foreseeability is a
vacuous concept,  and therefore cannot  (as Holmes  himself had supposed)  provide  a ground
for setting  a meaningful  limit on liability.  See Restatement  (Third)  of Torts:  Liability  for
Physical  Harm  §  7,  reporters'  note  to  cmt. j,  at  110  (Proposed  Final  Draft  No.  1,  2005).
Likewise, William Landes and Richard Posner have declared  that causation  means whatever
it needs to mean to render tort law a scheme of efficient  deterrence. See William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economic  Structure of Tort Law 229-30 (1987).
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mainstream tort scholars have been working and arguing with each other in
a Holmesian  vein,  rather than fighting  against it, which is  to  say,  first and
foremost,  that they  accept  the  fundamental  tenet  that tort  law  is  a  law  of
liability rules rather than a law that imposes duties of conduct.
Holmes's argument for this fundamental  tenet  is identical  to his general
jurisprudential  argument  for  the  nonexistence  of legal  duties.  This,  we
believe, is a telling observation.  For while Holmesian duty skepticism may
be orthodoxy  in  tort theory,  the  identical jurisprudential  position has  long
been discredited within analytic jurisprudence.  The scholar who is credited
with  this  discrediting  is,  of course,  H.L.A.  Hart.  Our  claim  in  the  next
section  is  that  a  version  of  Hart's  influential  critique  of  Holmesian
jurisprudence  is equally  applicable at the level  of tort theory.  Because the
Holmesian position holds  no more  water as  a claim  about tort  law than  it
does as  a jurisprudential claim, we  argue that it is time to abandon some  of
the central features of modem tort theory.
II.  HART'S CRITIQUE, THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW, AND DUTY
REVISITED
A.  Hart's  Jurisprudential  Critique of  Holmes on Obligation
Hart's  critique  of Holmes  in  The  Concept of Law may be  divided  into
two parts,  one  negative  and  one  constructive.  On  the negative side,  Hart
shows  that  Holmes's  predictive  theory  of  law  is  untenable,  and  that
Holmes's proffered analysis of legal  obligations simply fails to capture the
phenomena  that  a  jurisprudential  theory  must  capture  in  order  to  be
adequate.  On the constructive  side, Hart provides a framework that yields a
plausible  analysis  of the  sense  in  which  it  is  cogent  to  talk  about  legal
obligations  (and legal  duties) as a species  of obligation  comparable  to, yet
distinct from, moral obligations recognized in everyday life.
1. The Negative  Aspect of the Critique
Hart's  negative  critique  of Holmes  on  duties  has  several  components.
We  will  focus  on  two:  the  argument  against  predictiveness,  and  the
argument from the obliged/obligated  distinction.
The Argument Against Predictiveness.  In  an  effort  to  account  for the
ordinary  parlance of duty-what it means for a speaker to assert that she is
under an obligation to refrain from doing X-Holmes proposed to treat such
statements  as  predictions  that  liability  will  follow  if she  does X.  Hart's
most concise, and in some ways most crushing, response to this view is that
people obviously can and often do mean  something distinct from predicting
the  onset  of  disagreeable  consequences  when  they  assert  that  they  (or
someone  else) are  under  a legal  obligation,  because  it is not incoherent  to
assert both that someone is subject to an obligation and that she is under no
risk of sanction:
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If  it  were  true  that  the  statement  that  a  person  had  an  obligation  [to
someone]  meant that he was likely  to suffer in the event  of disobedience,
it would be a contradiction to say that  he had an  obligation, e.g. to report
for military  service but that, owing  to the  fact  that he  had escaped  from
the jurisdiction,  or had  successfully bribed  the police  or the court, there
was not the slightest chance of his being caught or made to suffer.  In fact,
there  is no  contradiction  in  saying  this,  and  such  statements  are  often
made and understood.
36
Additionally,  Hart pointed out that assertions  about  obligations clearly  can
carry some  content other than predictive content.  Elsewhere,  Hart observed
that  Holmes's  "predictive"  analysis  is  particularly  unable  to  account  for
judicial speech about obligations.
37
The Argument from the Obliged/Obligated  Distinction. Perhaps the most
memorable  negative  argument  in  The  Concept  of  Law  against  the
Holmesian  conception  of  obligation  is  in  some  ways  the  most  subtle.
Holmes believed that having a legal duty (or obligation) to  do X  as a result
of a law put forward by the  sovereign was roughly analogous  to being told
by  a  threatening  gunman  that  one  must  do  X.  Such  a  person  would  be
obligated to do X  on pain of suffering some sanction that the more powerful
party is in a position to inflict.  In law, the more powerful party is the state.
Hart  responded  that  to  adopt  such  a  picture  is  to  lose  sight  of  the
distinction  between  being  obliged and  being obligated.  The  addressee,  in
the above example,  might truly describe himself as "obliged  to do X."  But
if the threat  issued  were  the only  reason provided  to him  to  do X,  then  it
would not be correct to  describe this as an obligation to  do X:  "There  is a
difference...  between  the  assertion  that  someone  was  obliged  to  do
something  and  the  assertion  that  he  had an obligation to  do  it.' 38  The
former  is  a psychological  statement  referring  to  the  beliefs  and  motives
with  which the  action  is  done.  "But  the  statement  that  someone  had an
obligation to do  something  is of a  very  different type...  ."  -39  It  connotes
that there  are or may be mandatory reasons  applicable  to the person  under
the  obligation  in  light  of which  he  ought  to  do X.  Holmes's  account  of
duties misses this distinction entirely.
2.  The Constructive Aspect of the Critique
A large subset of laws, on Hart's view, consists of what he calls "primary
rules." 40  The  force  of these  primary rules  is  to enjoin, direct,  or demand
(generally)  conduct of a certain  form.  "Car lights are to be used after dusk
or when  it is raining" is a primary  rule, directing persons who drive cars to
turn on their headlights  under  certain  circumstances.  "The  fork and knife
36.  Hart, supra note 6, at 84.
37.  Id. at  10-11.
38.  Id. at 82.
39.  Id. at 83.
40.  Id. at91.
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should be  put on the plate  when  one  is finished  eating"  is  a primary rule,
too-one  of  etiquette.  Some  forms  of  rule-legal  and  moral,  for
example-impose  obligations, while other forms of rule-rules of etiquette,
for example-do not.
Hart contended that three features separate those domains of life in which
socially  recognized  rules  are  conceived  of  as  imposing  obligations  and
those in which they  are not.  First, "[r]ules  are conceived  and spoken of as
imposing  obligations  when  the  general  demand for conformity  is  insistent
and the social  pressure brought to  bear upon those who  deviate or threaten
to  deviate  is  great. '41  Second, and  in  part explaining  why there  is  social
pressure,  in  the  domain  where  obligations  are  imposed  by rules,  the  rules
"are  believed  to  be  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  social  life  or  some
highly prized feature of it."42  In the third place,
it is  generally  recognized  that the  conduct  required by  these rules  may,
while benefiting others,  conflict with what the person who owes the duty
may  wish  to  do.  Hence  obligations  and  duties  are  thought  of  as
characteristically  involving  sacrifice  or  renunciation,  and  the  standing
possibility  of conflict  between  obligation  or  duty  and  interest  is,  in  all
societies,  among the truisms of both the lawyer and the moralist.43
Hart, of course, believed that legal systems are among those whose primary
rules  do  impose  obligations  and  duties.  His  recognition  that  the primary
rules  of law  enjoyed these  three  features,  is  coupled  with  his analysis  of
obligations as particular to rules  enjoying these features.  The result is  that
Hart  is able to offer an interesting explanation  of what  it means to say that
the  law  imposes  obligations,  beyond  saying  that  it  has  rules  that  enjoin
conduct.
So  a person has a  legal  duty to  do X, according to Hart,  so long as there
exists a  valid  legal  rule  applicable  to  him  that  enjoins him  to  do X.  To
assert that a person has a  legal duty to do X is not to predict that he will be
sanctioned if he does not do X.  It is to  assert that there exists a valid legal
rule  applicable  to  him  that  says,  in  effect,  "Do  X."  It  is  normally  a
consequence of such a rule existing that the legal system will also empower
someone  to  impose  a  sanction  or liability  for the  failure  to  live  up to  its
primary rules, but asserting that there is a primary rule "Do X"  applicable to
the  actor  is  not  simply predicting  what  will  or might  happen  if the  actor
does not do X.
A citizen's  capacity to recognize  legal  obligations  is,  in part, a capacity
to recognize  legal  norms  as enjoining  conduct-to  grasp  that  some  valid
part of the  legal  system  is,  in  effect,  speaking  to  a kind of situation  and
directing  that  she  act  (or not  act)  a  certain  way  in  that  situation.  In  The
Path of the Law, Holmes famously advised graduating law students that the
good  lawyer  develops  expertise  in  gleaning  information  from  the  legal
41.  Id. at 86.
42.  Id. at 87.
43.  Id.
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system applicable  to his clients-information  about what possible  sanctions
lie ahead  for certain  courses  of conduct.  Hart,  by contrast,  emphasizes  a
lawyer's or layperson's  capacity  to glean information  about what  the legal
system  is  saying  one  is permitted  or  not permitted to  do.  Hart famously
distinguishes  his  legal  actor's  perspective  from  the  one  described  by
Holmes:  The Hartian  actor occupies the  "internal point of view,"  whereas
the Holmesian occupies the "external point of view."44
B.  Applying Hart's  Jurisprudential  Critique to Tort Theory
1. The Presumptively Hartian Nature of Tort Law
Hart's jurisprudential argument bears  on modem tort theory  in two ways.
First,  it  creates  philosophical  space  for  a  non-Holmesian,  duty-accepting
account  of tort  law.  After  Hart,  there  are  no  grounds  for supposing  that
Holmesian reductionism  about duties is the only analytically respectable  or
hard-headed  position  to  take  on  the  issue  of  how  to  understand  law
generally and tort law in particular.
Second,  and more  affirmatively,  Hart's approach  points  toward the  sort
of evidence  to which one might appeal,  in the first instance,  to  support the
claim  that,  in  fact,  a given  body  of law  is  a body  of genuine  duties,  not
liability  rules.  The  phenomena  one  would  want  to  observe,  he
demonstrated, concern how ordinary citizens,  lawyers, and officials talk and
act  in certain  spheres-in  particular, what  they  say, and  what they  mean
when they  say, that one is under some sort of duty not to injure another.  In
other  words,  once  one  concedes,  as  we  believe  one  must  concede,  that
Hart's  picture  of legal  duties  as genuine  duties  is  no  less  available  than
Holmes's  picture  of legal  duties  as liability  rules,  the  question of how to
make  sense  of  tort  law  ceases  to  be  theoretical  or  philosophical  (as
Holmes's  analysis  seems  to  suppose),  and  instead becomes  interpretive-
how best to characterize  tort  law as  it is  actually practiced  and understood
by participants and observers.
With  this  question  in  mind,  we  think there  is  an  overwhelming  prima
facie  case in favor of a duty-accepting  conception  of tort.  Simply put, the
practice  of tort law has  long been built, and remains built, around  concepts
that  point  toward  a  law  of  genuine  duties  rather  than  pseudo-duties.
Admittedly, Holmesian  tort scholars  have marshaled  arguments  suggesting
that  tort  law  is  something  quite  different  than  it  appears  to  be.  We  will
discuss and rebut several such arguments in Part III.  For now, however,  we
will merely note some of the features  that seem rather evidently to  favor a
Hartian understanding of tort law as a law of duties.
For centuries, lawyers  have talked  about the  law  of trespass, the  law  of
private  wrongs,  and the  law  of tort.  In doing  so,  they have  conceived  of
each  in terms of obligations,  wrongs,  and redress,  not agencies,  fees,  and
44.  Id. at 89-91.
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risks  of sanction.  In particular,  as  we  noted  above,  at  least  by the  mid-
1700s,  the various  actions  cognizable  under the writs  of trespass  and  case
came to  be understood as a gallery of wrongs-a catalogue of the ways  in
which one  person could act wrongfully toward another, such that  the other
would  be  entitled  to demand redress  at law  from the  other.45  If tort  law
were really,  as Holmesians  suppose,  a regulatory  scheme for deterring  and
compensating,  the  traditional  vocabulary  and  syntax  of tort  ought to  have
developed quite differently than it did.  And, of course,  it is hardly the case
that judges and lawyers in modem times have simply abandoned these ways
of thinking and talking about torts.46
Likewise, it tells us something that, in ordinary conversation,  we have no
trouble invoking the  idea of a legal duty independently  of the idea of moral
duty  and  the  idea  of risk of sanction.  Thus,  if asked,  most  of us  would
acknowledge  that  we  act under  a  legal  duty to refrain  from  driving  while
intoxicated.  And we would mean by that that the  law actually obligates  us
to refrain from driving when we are in that condition.  We would not mean
only  that  one  can  reliably  predict  facing  a  fine  or  jail  time  for  such
behavior.  (This,  even  though  most  would  cite  the  risk  of  a  fine  or
imprisonment  as one of several reasons,  perhaps  even the main reason,  for
heeding the  duty.)  When confronted  with an  instance  of a conviction  for
45.  See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
46.  A  standard appellate  opinion  affirming  a judgment  for  the plaintiff in  a negligence
case might read (in artificially condensed  form) as follows:
The defendant  owed the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable  care against  causing
her physical  harm.  The jury  found,  and was  entitled  to  find,  that the  defendant
breached  that duty, and that the breach caused harm to the plaintiff of the sort that
the defendant was duty-bound to take care against causing.  Therefore, the plaintiff
was entitled to compensation from the defendant for the injury done to her.
Now imagine the same opinion written in the language of modem  Holmesian  tort theory:
We, the members of the ministry  of deterrence and compensation (MDC), must
consider whether to  assess the  undesired  conduct fee  (UCF)  on  subject  (S),  who
has been brought to our attention by notifying citizen  (N).  We  determine  that S's
conduct  is the  sort to which  the  fee attaches.  Because  the  government desires  to
induce citizens to notify the MDC of undesired conduct so that such conduct might
be deterred, and because the government  wishes to provide monetary assistance to
those who  have experienced certain misfortunes, the UCF is payable  only if, as  is
the  case  here,  the  notifying  person  establishes  a  nontrivial  possibility  of some
connection  between  the  undesired  conduct  and  a  setback  experienced  by  the
notifying  person.  Having established  this possibility,  N  is  entitled  to recoup  the
UCF, owed in the first instance  to the MDC, which is set at an amount equal to the
value of the setback suffered by N.  The MDC will grant ad hoc  exemptions  from
the  UCF  to advance  other worthy  policy  goals or to prevent  the  fee  system  from
working an injustice.  However, it finds no basis for granting an exemption here.
The  point of this obviously  stylized  contrast  is  to  suggest, as  have others,  that,  while  the
vocabulary  of tort  law  is not  God-given  or sacrosanct,  neither  is  it  a  collection  of empty
labels waiting to be filled with whatever content commentators  wish to pour into  it. See, e.g.,
Jules L.  Coleman,  The Practice of Principle:  In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal
Theory  13-24  (2001)  (arguing  that certain  versions  of economic  analysis  of tort  law are
interpretively impoverished  for not being able to make sense of the language of the  practice
of tort law);  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic  Conceptualism, 6  Legal Theory 457,  457-66,
470-80, 483-85 (2000) (arguing the same).
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driving under the influence,  we generally do not think it correct to say, "Oh,
there's a guy  who  got hit  with the  drunk-driving  tax"-that  is, unless  the
speaker is playing off of conventional  meanings.  We would also be able to
distinguish this legal duty from the independent question of whether there is
a moral  duty to refrain from driving while intoxicated.  (This,  even though
the likelihood that there is  such a moral duty informs  lawyers'  and judges'
judgments  as  to whether  there ought to  be a parallel  legal  duty.)  That we
can  in  our  everyday  language  and  everyday  experience  talk  about  legal
duties as  a distinctive phenomenon  was to Hart, and is to  us, an  important
clue as to how  we  should analyze  the concept of law  and the concept of a
legal duty.
The  suggestion  of this  section  is  modest.  We  do  not  purport  to  have
resolved  fundamental  debates  over  the  nature  and  character  of tort  law.
Rather,  we  aim  to  have  shed  some  light  on  how best  to  approach  them.
Hart's antireductionist  approach to jurisprudence  proceeds  on the  idea that
language  and practices  ought to be taken  seriously.  This is not to  say that
existing ways of doing and talking are always coherent, much less that they
are  always appealing or defensible.  It  is to say instead that the appropriate
first move  in  an  effort  to  theorize  a  subject  is  to  work  with,  rather  than
dismiss  as  empty,  the  ways in  which those  acting within  a practice  make
sense  of  it.  If  one  takes  this  approach  to  understanding  tort  law,  we
suggest,  one  has to  concede that,  in the first instance,  it presents  itself and
hangs together as a law of rights,  duties, and wrongs.  Of course it  still may
be  the  case  that appearances  are  misleading,  or that  this  way  of thinking
about  the  law  is  unsatisfactory.  But  there  is  no  philosophical  reason  to
adopt  this  supposition  from  the  start.  Quite  the  opposite,  it  is  entirely
possible for tort law to be what it appears to be.  The proof of the skeptical
thesis  will have  to be  in  the pudding,  and the  skeptics bear  the burden  of
making that showing.  As we have argued elsewhere,  and will argue below,
the  skeptics  have not met  their burden.  Tort law  is better  understood and
explained  as  a  law  of  guidance  rules  than  a  scheme  of  liability  rules.
However,  before  turning  in  Part  III  to  consider  the  merits  of  some
prominent claims made on behalf of duty-skeptical accounts  of tort law, we
first will pause to observe some reasons  why many duty-skeptics  should not
be  threatened  by,  and  indeed  ought  to  be  receptive  to,  duty-accepting
theories of tort law.
2.  Why Holmesian Tort Theorists Ought to Be Receptive to a Hartian
Conception  of Duty
Holmesian duty-skepticism arises  in part out of some legitimate concerns
about  potential  drawbacks  associated  with  duty-accepting  theories  of tort
law.  Some  of these  are  equivalent  to the  concerns  that  Holmes  himself
harbored  about  thinking  of law  in  terms  of  real  duties,  including  the
concern  that  doing so generates  a conception  of law that is  soft-minded  or
too moralistic.  Other concerns-particularly  the worry  that duty-accepting
theories inevitably link tort to regressive political  values-are not ones that
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Holmes  shared.  The point  is that Holmes was,  and  Holmesians often  are,
attracted  to the radical jurisprudential  position  of duty  skepticism  out of a
belief that the adoption of such a position is necessary  to ward off thinking
about  tort  that  is  too  squishy,  too  priggish,  and/or  too  politically
conservative.  One  of Hart's  great  achievements  was  to  demonstrate  that
these  associations  are false.  A jurisprudence  that treats  duties  as genuine
obligations  need not  entail  any  of these  "sins,"  and  thus  duty  skepticism
cannot be defended,  and should not be embraced,  as somehow necessary  to
avoid them.
Here,  one  must  recall that Hart took  himself to  be  a positivist working
within  the  tradition  developed  by  Bentham,  Austin,  and  Holmes.  Thus,
Hart  claimed  to  share  some  of  their  core  aspirations,  including  the
aspiration to separate law from morality.  Unlike his predecessors, however,
Hart believed  that this separation was not to be  achieved  by defining  legal
duties by  reference to  underlying  sovereign  commands, but in  appreciating
that  legal duties derive from legal rules.  That legal duties are distinctive in
this way,  Hart argued,  explains why their content does not  simply track or
collapse into moral duties.
Hart  likewise  linked  his  anti-skeptical  approach  to  the  progressive
aspirations  of positivism  found,  most  obviously,  in the  work of Bentham.
That  is,  Hart perceived  an  intimate  connection  between  being faithful  to,
and clear on, the meaning  of concepts  and the cause of law reform.  In this
respect,  Hart  was  an  anti-antiformalist.  One  of the  core  claims  of the
antiformalists of the early and middle  decades of the twentieth  century was
that  "formalism"  is nothing  but a bar to progressive  law reform,  and hence
that "realism"  about law-i.e.,  anti-conceptualism-was  needed to achieve
reform. 47   Hart's  sense,  by  contrast,  was  that  careful  attention  to  the
meaning  and  implications  of the  words  that  we  use  and the  practices  in
which  discourse  takes  place  can  provide  a platform  from  which to  locate
and  launch  sensible  reforms.  With  respect  to this  aspiration,  Hart's  and
Holmes's  thinking  again  shared  a  trait,  yet  also  fundamentally  differed.
Holmes,  like  Hart, explicitly  defended  his effort to redefine  law and legal
duty  as necessary  to "get  the  dragon out of his cave"  so that  an intelligent
decision  could  be made  as  to  whether  to tame  or kill it.48  But  Holmes's
very  un-Hartian  instinct was  to achieve  this  goal  by  stripping  away  from
legal  concepts  any  moral  tincture,  including  any  attribution  to  them  of
normativity or ought-ness.  Hart likewise  sought to demystify  law  in large
part  to  counteract  what  he  took  to  be  a  tendency  among  officials  and
47.  See  Felix  S.  Cohen,  Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional  Approach,  35
Colum.  L.  Rev.  809  (1935)  (arguing  that  the  deconstruction  of  legal  concepts  is  the
necessary  first step  toward an  enlightened  and  scientific  approach  to the law).  We  do not
mean to take a position on whether a reductionist approach to legal concepts  is a hallmark of
Legal  Realism in all  its many variants.  It is clearly  a prominent  feature in the work of some
Realists, including Cohen.
48.  Holmes, Path of  the Law, supra note 5, at 469.
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ordinary citizens to treat it with excessive reverence. 49  It is just the law,  he
wanted people  to  see, not  God's word,  so  if we  want to reform  it  we  can
and should.  Yet Hart's  method  for achieving this  end  was  not to  remove
the ought-ness from law but to capture what is distinctive about legal ought-
ness as opposed to moral ought-ness.
For these reasons, Hart's work offers some cogent and practical  guidance
on how to think about tort law in a non-Holmesian vein.  It encourages us to
take the  language of tort law  at face value-to  resist the  common  impulse
among  law professors to  say, "When a judicial opinion uses the legal term
X (duty,  foreseeability,  cause,  etc.), it  is really just saying that, for reasons
of policy  or principle,  liability  ought  or ought  not to  attach  in this  case."
Specifically,  on the issue of duty in negligence  law, Hart  likewise offered a
compelling riposte to the now-familiar Prosserian mantra that a duty of care
exists when a court  says it exists.50  A statement to this effect,  Hart pointed
out, does  not mean  that negligence  law  is a practice  in which the  decision
maker's  completely  discretionary  decision  determines  the  outcome. 51
Rather, it is  a hyperbolic  way of emphasizing  that, in hard cases for which
there is  more than one reasonable  resolution, the resolution reached by the
highest court  in the relevant jurisdiction will be dispositive  simply because
of the jurisdictional  rule specifying that that court is the final arbiter of such
questions.
And, again, Hart's conceptualism  is not meant as hairsplitting for its own
sake.  Instead,  it encourages  us to resist the reductionist's "X is just a way
of saying  Y'  mantra  to lay the groundwork  for sensible  law reform.  How
so?  As we  have argued  extensively  elsewhere, if one actually  approaches
tort  law from  the  inside,  making  sense of its  core  concepts  and how they
hang  together,  then  one  is  left  not  (merely)  with  a pretty  picture,  but  a
schematic  that  permits  one  to  ask more  sensible  questions  about  how tort
law should be  shaped going forward.52  For example,  as we have discussed
above, Holmesian scholars are all too prone to say (wrongly) that tort law is
a  system  for  deterring  antisocial  conduct  and  compensating  victims  for
costs  related to  injuries.  As a result,  when studies  emerge  suggesting that
only one out often patients with viable medical malpractice claims  sue their
doctors,  they  are  taken  to  demonstrate  that  tort  law  is  disastrously
dysfunctional.53  While  the  latter conclusion  may  in the  end be  true, this
particular argument is fatally flawed because of its false premise.  Tort law,
49.  See H.L.A.  Hart,  Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71  Harv.  L.
Rev. 593, 596-97  (1958).
50.  William L.  Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52  Mich.  L.  Rev.  1, 15  (1953)  ("There is a
duty  if the court says there  is a duty;  the law [of negligence],  like the Constitution,  is  what
we make it.").
51.  Hart, supra  note 6, at  141-47.
52.  See, e.g.,  John C.P. Goldberg  & Benjamin  C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88  Va. L.
Rev.  1625  (2002)  (using  pragmatic  and  conceptualistic  tort  theory  to  clarify  doctrine
regarding  liability for exposure-only victim cases).
53.  John  C.P.  Goldberg,  What Are  We  Reforming?:  Tort Theory's Place in Debates
over Malpractice  Reform, 59 Vand. L. Rev.  1075  (2006).
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if its concepts are taken seriously,  is not a social or regulatory  program that
aims  to  maximize  compensation  and/or  deterrence.  As  we  have  argued
elsewhere,  it  is  in  fact  much  closer  to  being  the  system  that  Locke  and
Blackstone described,  i.e., a law of private wrongs.5 4  That is, it is a branch
of law  that arms  victims  with a particular power-the  power to sue others
who have wronged them for redress, if they choose to do so.  It follows that,
if they do not choose to sue,  and if that choice is informed and voluntary  in
the  appropriate  sense  (which  is  partly  an  empirical  question,  of course),
then  the  theorist  has  lost  the  principal  basis  for  thinking  the  system  is
broken.  It  is working  exactly  as it should.  The  idea of a private  wrong is
the idea of a wrong as between  injurer and victim:  a breach of a duty owed
by  the  tortfeasor  to  the  victim  that  gives  rise  to  a  right  in  the  victim  to
respond  to the wrongdoer.  The victim's power to sue  is thus not correctly
captured  by the  idea of the  "private  attorney general"-the  ordinary Joe or
Jane  who,  bearing  a  tin star,  does  the public's bidding with complaint  and
discovery  requests.  A  tort action is a right of the victim.  Hence, it is one
that he  or  she can forbear  from asserting  even if doing  so  will undermine
the cause of deterrence or compensation. 55
More  broadly,  a  Hartian  appreciation  of tort  law's core  concepts,  even
though  it asks  us  to  take  the  internal  structure  and  logic of tort law  more
seriously than does Holmesian tort scholarship, can help ward off an unduly
reverential  disposition  toward  tort  law, just  as  Hart  hoped  that  his  work
would  ward  off such  an  attitude  toward  law  generally.  Consider,  in  this
regard,  corrective  justice  theory.  Corrective  justice  theory  has  many
virtues, including  the virtue  of being  anti-Holmesian  in some respects.  In
particular, as demonstrated perhaps most clearly  in Ernest Weinrib's work,
it can take  seriously the idea of tort law as a law of wrongs. 56  Yet there  is a
way  in which  it glosses  over aspects  of tort  law that,  when  confronted on
their own terms, seems to divorce tort law from justice (at least on a certain
understanding),  and  may  even  make  it  somewhat  less  appealing  from  a
normative  perspective.  In particular, the core  corrective justice notions of
erasure,  annulment,  restoration,  and  repair arguably  present  tort  law  in  a
light  that  is  at  times  too  generous.  Tort  law  is  not  a  matter  of the  state
ordering a tortfeasor to make good on a moral debt (or moral duty of repair)
owed  to the victim,  even  though most  tort plaintiffs  are,  of course,  given
damages  meant  to  compensate  them for  their losses.  Instead,  it  is  about
arming victims with a legal power to pursue those who have wronged them.
Tort, in other words,  enables  victims to exact redress  from those who have
54.  See Goldberg, supra note  10; Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Philosophy  of Private  Law,
in  The  Oxford  Handbook  of Jurisprudence  & Philosophy  of Law  623  (Jules  Coleman  &
Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2002).
55.  Although  Hart was not a tort theorist, he  once  sketched  a picture  of tort  law  that is
quite  compatible  with  the foregoing,  perhaps adding  some credence  to  our claiming  of his
mantle  in  this  area.  See H.L.A.  Hart,  Essays  on  Bentham:  Studies  in  Jurisprudence  and
Political  Theory  183-85 (1982).
56.  See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The  Idea of Private Law (1994).
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mistreated  them  in  certain  ways.57   Contra  Holmes,  to  embrace  this
conception of tort  is not to equate  it with talionic  vengeance.  Instead, it is
to appreciate  that tort is a civilized alternative  to vengeance-civil  recourse
for the plaintiff, which  is appropriately  channeled  through  and cabined  by
law.  But it  is  also  to  appreciate  and accept  that  successful  tort plaintiffs
will sometimes  be  entitled  to something  more  than  "justice"  demands  or
even permits,  at least  if justice  is understood  as the  achievement  of a just
distribution of gains and losses as between tortfeasor and victim.  Here, the
most obvious example  is the eggshell  plaintiff, who may stand to recover  a
huge  amount of compensation  from a minimally  culpable defendant.  It  is
questionable  whether justice is being done in such cases, but our tort system
authorizes  this  sort  of outcome  because  tort  law  is  not  a  scheme  for
restoring  a normative  equilibrium as between  doer and  sufferer.  It  is,  for
better and worse, a law for the redress of private wrongs.
III.  GOING FORWARD FROM HART'S CRITIQUE OF HOLMES
We  have  argued  that Hart's jurisprudential  work helps  to  establish  that
there is a place for a meaningful notion of duty qua obligation in the law  of
torts.  This is because  Hart helps us to  see that there is no reason to equate
being  careful,  hard-headed,  or  realistic  about  tort  law  with  an  effort  to
denude it of morally tinged, yet ultimately distinctively legal, concepts such
as duty.  In tort, duties are no more or  less "real"  than acts of carelessness
or damages.  Yet they are genuinely  legal duties--duties  by virtue of their
being  part  of the  law.  With  this  insight, certain  mainstays  of Holmesian
thought  melt  away.  For  example,  the  idea  that  the  objectivity  of  the
reasonable  person  standard  entails  that tort  law  cannot  be  about  genuine
duties reveals  itself as a non sequitur.  Possibly, the argument would carry
weight  if we  were  discussing  moral  duties.58  But  tort  duties  are  legal
duties,  and legal  duties  obligate  for different reasons,  and  under  different
circumstances,  than moral duties.59
As we observed above, the ability of Hart's work  to create  a  space for a
notion  of legal  duty  does  not of itself suffice  to  salvage  duty  in tort law.
Rather, it places on duty-skeptical tort theorists the onus of explaining away
57.  For  a rich mediation  on the interrelated  ideas  of settling  accounts, getting even,  and
doing justice,  see  William  Ian  Miller,  Eye for  an Eye  1-30  (2006).  As Miller  points  out,
there  is  a  natural  linkage  between  the  notion  of enabling  a  victim  to  get  even  with  a
wrongdoer and the  notion of restoring  harmony, peace,  or balance.  Id. at  15-16.  Still,  there
is  no particular  reason  to equate  the  restoration  of civil  order  with  the  restoration  of the
status quo ante-victims'  legitimate  demands for satisfaction or vindication may require  (or
at least permit) the  law to offer them something more (or  different) than a return to the pre-
tort state of affairs.
58.  But  see John  Gardner,  Wrongs  and Faults, 59  Rev.  of Metaphysics  95  (2005)
(arguing  powerfully  that  it  is cogent  to  identify  moral  wrongs  that  are wrong  simply by
virtue of being breaches  of duties, not because they involve wrongful conduct).
59.  See John  C.P. Goldberg  &  Benjamin  C.  Zipursky,  Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
Cornell L.  Rev. (forthcoming  2007)  (defending  the objectivity  of the legal standard for fault
within a wrongs-based  conception of tort).
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the  seemingly  obvious  linkage  of  tort  to  notions  of  duty,  wrongs,  and
redress.  In  fact,  Holmes  and  Holmesian  tort  theorists  have  attempted  to
meet this burden with various  arguments.  Among the more  prominent  are
the following:
(1)  Within the part of tort  law  that overtly avails  itself of the notion of
duty-negligence  law-the concept of duty does no real  work because it
is redundant with the breach element of the prima facie case.
(2)  The divergence  between  conduct  for which  tort law  assigns liability
and conduct  that society  deems  morally  wrongful  is too  great  to  render
plausible a genuinely duty-based conception of tort law.
(3)  The notion of a duty of conduct  rooted in  a positive  legal  directive
makes  no  sense  in  tort  law,  which  is  not  based  upon  legislative  rules
about conduct, but in common law decisions about liability.
In prior work, both jointly and severally, we have explained why we believe
each  of these  objections  to  be  unsound.60  In  what  follows,  we  briefly
review those arguments and reconsider each with Hart in mind.
A.  Duty in Negligence Law
The  argument  that  duty  in  negligence  law  is  redundant  traces  back  at
least to the British scholars Percy Winfield and W.W. Buckland,61 and runs
roughly as  follows.  The  cause of action  for negligence  is defined in terms
of four elements:  (1) duty of reasonable  care;  (2)  unreasonable conduct  in
breach  of that duty;  (3) injury to the plaintiff;  and (4) a causal  connection
(including  proximate cause)  between  the breach  of duty  and the plaintiffs
injury.  But the duty-of-care element is redundant because  if there has been
unreasonable  conduct, then there has by definition  been a breach  of a duty
to  take  reasonable  care.  A  fortiori,  there  must  have  been  a  duty  of
reasonable  care.  Any  statement  from  a  court  indicating  that  there  is
evidence  of a breach  presupposes  the existence  of the  duty, for the duty  is
simply the duty to refrain from acting unreasonably.  Any statement from a
court  indicating  that the duty  element is not satisfied is  a confused way  of
saying  that the court  does not wish the cause of action to proceed for  some
reason other than the absence of an obligation of care.
Insofar  as this  is meant  to  be a conceptual  argument  about  the inherent
redundancy  of duty with breach,  it is quite obviously fallacious,  for there is
a way of looking  at negligence  law-indeed, a standard way of looking  at
negligence  law-that  renders  the  duty  element  independent  of the  other
elements,  including the breach element.  In this view, it is entirely cogent to
assert  that  a  plaintiff  has  a  cause  of  action  in  negligence  only  if the
60.  See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2;  John C.P.  Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky,  The Restatement  (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L.
Rev. 657 (2001).
61.  See  W.W.  Buckland,  The Duty to  Take  Care, 51  Law  Q.  Rev.  637,  639  (1935);
Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 Colum. L.  Rev. 41, 43  (1934).
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defendant breached  a duty of reasonable  care  owed to her and, in doing so,
caused  her injury.  Of course,  in  situations  in which  a tort duty of care  is
owed,  it will usually not be owed only  to one person, but instead to  a class
of persons.  But to note this is hardly to abandon the view that  negligence
law  is  about  relational  duties  of reasonable  care,  such  that  only  some
persons can claim  to  be beneficiaries  of the duty  who  are able  to point to
the  unreasonable  conduct  in  question  and  say of it:  "That  conduct  was
unreasonable  as to  me."  For  all  instances  in  which  a claim  is made  by a
victim  who  falls  outside  the  class  of duty  beneficiaries,  courts  can  quite
sensibly reason, and do reason, that the victim's claim fails  for lack of duty:
this  even  if the  defendant  "breached"  in  the  sense  of acting  carelessly
toward  persons  who,  unlike  the  victim, are members  of the relevant  class.
True,  one  of the hallmarks  of modem  negligence  law  is that  it  identifies
duties of reasonable  care that are  owed to members  of very broad  classes,
such as  the  class  of persons  who might  foreseeably  suffer physical  harm
were  one to fail to  act carefully with respect to the risk of such harm.  But
this  fact  does  not  somehow  defeat  the  idea  that  one  can  sometimes  act
carelessly  toward  members  of one  class of persons  without failing  to  take
care with respect to another class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged.
To  take  a familiar  example,  accountant  A's carelessly performed  audit of
the books  of company  C might well  be a breach of a duty of care owed  to
identifiable  persons or entities who A  knew  would be making a decision to
invest  in  C on the basis  of its audit.  It  hardly follows  that A  owed  it  to
everyone  in  the  world to  conduct  a  careful  audit,  such  that  anyone  who
loses money by investing in C in reliance  on the carelessly performed audit
can point to  it as a breach of a  duty owed to her.  There  is simply nothing
structurally or logically  ill-formed about this way of looking  at negligence
law.  Indeed, it is fairly clear that most courts understand negligence law  in
this way.
62
But perhaps  instead of pressing  a conceptual  argument,  it may  be  that
Buckland,  Winfield,  and  others  who  have  followed  in  their  footsteps-
including  Prosser,  Judge  William  Andrews  in  his  famous  dissent  in
Palsgrafv.  Long Island Railroad  Co.  ,63  and the current drafters of the Third
Torts  Restatement64-are  really  arguing  that  negligence  law  can be, but
should not be, conceived  in terms of relational  duties.  On  this version  of
the  claim,  it  stands  for the  idea  that  we  will  do  better  in  some  relevant
sense(s) to think about the duty of reasonable  care  as a non-relational duty,
i.e., duty owed to all the world.
To this  rendition of the argument  we have several  responses.  First, and
most  obviously,  if this  is  really  the  argument,  it needs  to be  stated  and
defended as such.  To run together an argument that a relational conception
62.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra  note  61,  at 658-74.
63.  Palsgraf  v.  Long  Island  R.R.  Co.,  162  N.E.  99,  103  (N.Y.  1928)  (Andrews,  J.,
dissenting).
64.  See generally Goldberg  & Zipursky,  supra note  60,  at  692-736  (discussing  and
criticizing the Restatement's embrace of duty skepticism).
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of duty  is incoherent  or confused  with an argument  that  it  is available  but
less  desirable  than  an  alternative  view  is  to  misrepresent  the  available
options in  a serious way  and to avoid an argument  on the  merits.  Second,
we  continue  to  believe  that  the  historical  and  doctrinal  evidence  points
strongly  in favor of deeming the non-redundant, relational  view as the view
that has  in fact been  adopted by most  courts,  notwithstanding  a relentless
academic campaign to change the practice.65
Third,  the  supposedly  powerful  moral  argument  against  the  relational
view  is,  in  fact,  fallacious,  and  it  continues  to  be  the  case  that  our
unmasking of that fallacy has  been  ignored.  The fallacy is to suppose that
once  one concedes  that some  duties of reasonable  care  are  in some sense
universal---owed  to  everyone,  or  to  a  very  broad  class  of persons-one
must abandon  the relational  model  of duty for a non-relational  model.  As
we  have  demonstrated  elsewhere,  the  fallacy  resides  in  an  equivocation
over what is meant by the  idea of duty being  general or "universal. '66  As
Judge  Brett  famously  pointed  out  more  than  a  century  ago  in  Heaven v.
Pender, 67  the  duty  of reasonable  care  can  sometimes  be  owed to  anyone
foreseeably  placed  at  risk  of harm  by  one's  actions,  were  they  to  be
careless.  Likewise,  as  we  have  demonstrated  (without  any  response  or
rebuttal  from  anti-relationalists),  Cardozo's  opinion  in  MacPherson, long
taken  to  be  a  watershed  instance  of  a  court  adopting  a  non-relational
conception  of duty,  in  fact  adopted  the same  sort of relational-yet-general
notion of duty expressed by Brett.68
Fourth, we  have offered  a  series  of normative  and functional  arguments
that  favor  retention  of a  relational  conception  of duty  within  negligence
law.  We  will  rehearse  those  very  briefly  toward  the  end  of  this  essay.
Fifth, even if one  takes the non-relational  view of duty, it does not actually
entail the adoption  of the sort of fully Holmesian  view that there is no room
for a genuine notion  of obligation  within torts such as negligence.  This is
because the idea of a duty  owed to the world can in fact refer to a genuine
65.  See generally Benjamin  C.  Zipursky,  Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in  the Law of
Torts,  51  Vand.  L.  Rev.  1  (1998)  (identifying  various  aspects  of tort  doctrine  that  are
difficult to explain absent a relational conception of duty).
66.  Goldberg  &  Zipursky, supra note  60, at  705-09.  It  may  be true,  as  Jane  Stapleton
points  out  in  her  Symposium  paper,  that  some  courts  will  be  less  likely  to  recognize
appropriately  broad  orbits of duty  if  they  are  invited  to  take  a  relational  view.  See  Jane
Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky 's Civil Recourse Theory, 75 Fordham  L.  Rev.
1529  (2006).  This  does  not  strike  us  as  a  powerful  objection  to  the  views  we  have
articulated.  The central  point of our first coauthored article  is that it  is simply a fallacy  to
link  the  idea  of relational  duty  with  narrow  or regressive duty  doctrines.  See  Goldberg  &
Zipursky, supra note  2,  at  1799-1811  (arguing  that modern  duty skepticism  in  tort law  is
born of a false conceptual  linkage  of duty acceptance to  laissez-faire).  More  generally,  we
have  taken pains in our  work to explain just what  is  or is not entailed  by the adoption of a
relational conception  of duty-including  how  a relational  conception  can  and has  actually
incorporated  a  certain  conception  of a  general  or  universal  duty,  and  how  a well-drafted
Restatement  could help judges  avoid misapplying  duty doctrine.  See Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 60, at 698-720, 737-50.
67.  (1883)  11 Q.B.D. 503 (A.C.)  (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
68.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra  note 2, at  1812-25.
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duty  of conduct,  as  opposed  to  a  liability  rule,  even  though,  given  the
expansiveness of the duty, it  leaves courts no room to reason about duty in
resolving  negligence  cases.  (Understood  in  this  way,  the  analytically
simple duty of reasonable  care  would amount  to a directive  from courts to
individuals  enjoining  them  to  act  reasonably,  period.)  Thus,  the
redundancy  argument  is unsound, and,  in any  case, presents no conceptual
or moral obstacle to taking duty seriously in negligence law.
B.  The Schism Between Moral Duties and  Duties in Tort Law
A  more  serious  objection  against  conceptualizing  tort  law  in  terms  of
genuine  duties  is  that  there  is  such  a  substantial  divergence  between  the
terms  on which  tort  law  is  prepared  to  impose  liability  and  the terms  on
which one  can fairly  be described as  having failed to observe a moral duty
that  it is simply  implausible to think of tort duties as genuine  "oughts."  In
other words,  the  legal  "duties"  that  provide  the  basis  for  liability  in  tort
seem  to  be  both  seriously  under-inclusive  and  seriously  over-inclusive
relative  to  standard  notions  of morality  and  moral  duties.  For example,
liability can attach to blasting activity even if the blasting is done with great
care.  In such  a case, there may be legal responsibility even though there is
no breach  of a  standard  of right  conduct  specifiable  independently  of the
injury having actually occurred.  By  the  same token, there are instances  of
conduct,  such  as the failure  to undertake  even risk-free,  easy  rescues,  that
are  widely  taken to  be  violative of moral  duties, but  that  do not  generate
liability in tort because there  is said  to be "no  duty."  As indicated  above,
the risk that  lawyers would  be misled  by conflating  the demands  of moral
duties  and  the  scope  of  legal  liability  was  a  central  force  motivating
Holmes's argument that the concept of legal duty must be divorced from a
notion of genuine obligation.
On this issue, Hart's version of positivism provides  a helpful response  to
Holmes's  concerns.  Hart  analyzed  obligations  as  a  genus  of social  and
normative forms  (for lack of a better term),  and he  took moral  obligations
and  legal  obligations  each to  be different  species  of that genus.  To  some
extent,  Hart  was  following  Austin,  whose positivism  relied  heavily  on  a
taxonomy  of different  categories  of  "law,"  and  treated  social  mores  and
customary  norms  as  a  form  of law  distinct  from positive  law.69  Thomas
Aquinas, too, had  distinguished natural law  from  positive law in  a manner
that took note of parallels in their forms while distinguishing them in terms
of both  their  content  and  the  institutions  in  and  through  which  they
operated.70  In contrast to Austin, Hart aimed to redescribe  the content  and
nature of the normativity  as such  in terms of rules rather than commands,
while  still  following  Austin's  view  that  law  enjoys  an  independent
69.  Austin, supra note  16.
70.  See  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theologiae  (Fathers  of the  English  Dominican
Provice, trans., Christian Classics  Press 1981)  (n.d.).
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existence  and,  relatedly,  a  distinct  content  from  morality. 71  Conversely,
Hart  aimed to  retain  Aquinas's emphasis  on the normativity  of law  while,
of course,  rejecting  both  natural  law  metaphysics  and  the  idea  that  the
content  of positive  law  is  to  be  identified,  in  part,  by  understanding  the
natural law.
As indicated earlier, our own aim, within tort, has been to avail ourselves
of a roughly  Hartian  framework  for thinking about the nature  of duties  in
tort  law.  Duty  in  tort law is  about legal  obligation,  and  legal  obligations
are,  in many respects,  the same  sort of creature as moral obligations.  Both
involve  the  setting  of  standards  of obligatory  conduct;  both  involve  an
injunction  concerning how to  act  (particularly  with regard  to others); both
involve  social pressure and expectations of a certain kind; both are aimed to
preserve  important  human  goods.  And while  it  is  not  accidental  that  the
two  overlap  to  a  considerable  extent,  it  is  also  not  the  case  that  law
necessarily  derives  from  or  tracks  morality.  Rather,  it  is  because  legal
systems  and legal  obligations  are  developed with  an eye  to achieving  and
safeguarding  many of the goods that are also achieved  and safeguarded  by
moral  obligations.  Nevertheless,  because  law  comes  with  consequences
that  morality  does  not  (most  obviously  state-enforced  sanctions),  and
because there are, at  times, demands  on law  that it take  a certain form that
renders  it  efficacious,  capable  of  being  internalized,  and  amenable  to
application  by judges,  there  will  be  times  at  which  it  is  appropriate  for
legislatures  and judges and jurors  to decline to elevate certain moral norms
to  legal  norms.  Similarly,  there  are  sometimes  reasons  that  favor
recognition of legal norms that do not have counterparts in morality.72
Holmes,  of course, was deeply  concerned about slippage  between  moral
and  legal  duty.  This  suspicion  is  a profoundly  important  aspect  of the
positivism that begins  with Bentham's  assaults on  Blackstone  and travels
through  Austin  to  Holmes.  A  key  question  is  where  Hart  stood  on  this
issue.  Our  own  view-probably  not  too  controversial,  but  perhaps  not
trivial to defend-is that Hart here stood firmly with Bentham, Austin, and
Holmes  against Blackstone.  In particular, Hart  shared their worry that the
common  law  tradition  invites  lawyers  to blur  moral  and  legal  obligation.
Likewise,  Hart  self-identified  as  a  positivist  because  he  took  it  to  be  a
71.  Hart, supra note 6, at 155-57.
72.  In other writings,  we  have  offered explanations  as  to why  tort law  sets fairly  tight
limitations on liability for nonfeasance  and emotional harm-the under-inclusive  side of tort
obligations  relative  to  moral  obligations.  See, e.g.,  Goldberg & Zipursky,  supra note  2,  at
1799-1811;  Goldberg  &  Zipursky,  supra note  52,  at  1672-94.  We  have  also  offered
explanations  for the objectivity of breach and the significance  of rights-based  forms of strict
liability  such  as  those  found  in  trespass  law-the  over-inclusive  side  of tort obligations
relative  to moral  obligations.  See  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note  60.  It  may  be  that a
small  subsection of the domain  of cases  commonly treated as  strict liability  cases-namely
those  involving abnormally  dangerous  activities and  wild animals-are  instances in  which
tort law  functions  as a scheme  of liability  rules  (or as Keeton-esque  "conditional  duties").
The same  is  not true  for other areas  of tort law that are  sometimes  deemed  to be  areas  of
strict liability such as trespass, conversion, and nuisance.
1586 [Vol.  752006]  TORT LA W FROM THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW
central  feature  of that  school  of thought that  it deemed  such  blurrings  as
confusions and perils  to be avoided.  Of course  Hart had no truck with the
idea  that  moral  considerations  provide  reasons  for  the  recognition  or
extension  of  legal  obligations.  Rather,  he  seemed  concerned  over  a
perceived  tendency  for judges  to  reason  without  reflection  or  hesitation
from moral  to  legal  duty.  Although  Hart's positivist  sensibilities  lend  no
support to  an  argument against  the very  idea  of legal  obligations  or legal
obligations  in tort law,  they arguably prompt concern  over an approach  to
legal  analysis  by  which  the  analyst  invokes  moral  concepts  to  reach
conclusions  about  the existence  and scope  of legal  duties.  Insofar  as tort
law is thought to invite judges to undertake exactly this sort of analysis, one
might  conclude  that  Hart's  rescue  of the  concept  of duty  qua  obligation
ultimately  cannot  be  harnessed  to  support  an  account  of tort  law  built
around such  duties precisely because of his concerns  over leakage between
law and morality.
Our  response  to  this  envisioned  objection  is  to  concede  that  the
principles,  rules,  and standards  that comprise tort  law  contain a variety  of
moral concepts  within them, and that these  concepts figure  within tort  law
in a manner that calls  upon judges  and lawyers  to apply  them in order  to
ascertain  what  the  law  entails  for  the  resolution  of particular  disputes.
Within  constitutional  law  and  law that constitute  rules  of recognition,  this
sort  of  view  has  been  labeled  "incorporationism"  or  "inclusive
positivism."73  However, the application of this now-familiar  insight to the
law of tort requires no  such grand move or label.  All that we are  saying is
that  certain  moral  concepts  are  incorporated  into  substantive  legal  rules,
including  the  rules  of  tort  law,  which  means  that  judges  will  have  to
interpret and apply them  in the context  of deciding certain tort cases.  It is
an  interesting  and  important  analytical  question  whether  one  should
conceive  of judicial  applications  of these  concepts  as  an  exercise  of
delegated  power  to  "make"  law  (with  Joseph  Raz)  or  if one  should  say
(with  Ronald  Dworkin)  that  these  are  genuine  instances  of  law
application. 74  We are  inclined to take the  latter  route,  for reasons  that we
have  elaborated  elsewhere.75  But whichever route  one  takes,  it  is critical
that  the judge  accurately  identify  and  apply  the  legal norms  that  she  is
interpreting  and that she not simply assume that  she has been delegated the
all-things-considered  moral  question of how to resolve the  dispute or class
of disputes before her.
There are a variety of jurisprudential  reasons for analyzing legal duties as
analogous  to  moral duties,  without  seeing  legal  duties  as  simply  a  set of
applied  moral duties.  And there  are a variety of reasons,  institutional and
73.  See generally Coleman, supra note  46 (explaining  incorporationism  and  inclusive
positivism).
74.  See  Ronald  Dworkin,  Taking  Rights  Seriously  (2d  ed.  1977);  Joseph  Raz,  Legal
Principles  and the Limits of Law, 81  Yale L.J. 823  (1972).
75.  See, e.g.,  Goldberg &  Zipursky, supra  note  2; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 52;
Zipursky, supra note 46.
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otherwise,  why the content of these kinds of duties-moral  and legal-will
often differ.  Yet to appreciate this gap is not to deny that it is often the case
that  the  law  of  tort  contains  moral  concepts  that judges  are  required  to
deploy sensitively  in articulating  the content of the  legal obligations within
tort law.
C.  Tort Law as Case Law Pertaining  to Liability,  Not Statutory Directives
Two  structural  features  of tort  law present  what some  scholars  consider
to be the greatest obstacle to understanding tort in terms of legal obligations
of conduct.  Insofar  as tort  law  is  a creation  or issuance  of governmental
authorities, it consists of individual decisions rendered  by judicial actors on
the occasion  of particular cases,  not authoritative  directives of conduct  set
forth  by  a  legislative-  or  executive-branch  actor.  And  the  decisions  in
question  overwhelmingly  concern  whether  someone  is to be  held liable  to
another, ex post,  for damages.  Because tort takes the form not of forward-
looking  legislation  or regulation,  but  of backward-looking  attributions  of
liability by judges  and jurors,  tort  law  seems  to  some to  be  ineligible  for
treatment as a home for primary  rules of conduct.  Because  Hart's  analysis
of legal  obligations  of conduct  turns  on the  idea that  there  exists  a valid
primary  rule of conduct  within  the  law,  it  seems  to  follow that  tort  law
cannot be about legal obligations of conduct.
It will be useful,  initially, to  split this concern  into two:  the  first being
labeled  the  "judicial actor"  objection,  and  the  second  being  the  "liability
rule"  objection.  Let  us  begin  with  the  judicial  actor  objection,  which
challenges  the  possibility  of a  Hartian  theory  of legal  duty  in  tort  on the
ground that tort is largely  a judge-made form of law.  This concern confuses
two  aspects  of Hart's  positivism:  his  identification  of primary  rules  of
conduct  as  a  form  of  law,  and  his  penchant  for  selecting  examples  of
legislative  processes  as those  which would  satisfy  a rule of change  or rule
of recognition  in a modern  municipal system.  It  was, in fact, entirely  open
to Hart  to think that there are precedent-based  or custom-based  criteria for
law,  at  least  with  regard  to  subject  areas  that  have  predominantly  been
governed by a common law system, such as tort.  Indeed, there is plenty of
evidence that this is what Hart did believe.76  There  is therefore  no reason
to think  the judicial  source  of tort  law  undermines  the  possibility  that  it
contains  primary  rules  of conduct.  For example,  when a court  states that
product  manufacturers  must  give  consumers  adequate  warnings  of  the
nature,  severity,  and  likelihood  of  significant  product  risks,  it  is  rather
obviously recognizing a primary rule of conduct in the law of torts.
The  "liability  rule"  objection  states that  what courts  actually  do  in  tort
cases  is  recognize  and  apply  rules  governing  who  should have  to pay  for
which  injuries.  In  Hartian terms,  one  might  say  that courts  in these  cases
recognize  power-conferring  rules  that  give  plaintiffs  the  ability  to  exact
76.  See Hart, supra  note 6, at 97.
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damages  from  tortfeasors.  Or,  if one  wishes  to  use  the  idea  of "duty-
imposing  rules,"  one  might  say  that  courts  are  not  imposing  duties  upon
individuals requiring them to act or forbear from acting in certain ways, but
instead are imposing  duties on persons  to pay  for others'  losses whenever
certain  conditions  have  been  met.  In  either  case,  the  courts  are  not
recognizing primary rules of conduct enjoining non-tortious conduct.  If tort
is about  rules of conduct  at all,  it  is about rules  enjoining the payment  of
damages.
This objection  lets the tail of the theory wag the  dog of the phenomena
being  theorized.  Quite  plainly, courts  imposing  liability typically  describe
the  conduct the defendant  has engaged  in, and then classify the conduct  as
tortious by  articulating  a tort-a legal  wrong-that  has been done.  In  so
doing, they  are saying that a kind of conduct between  people-negligently
injuring, defrauding, battering, defaming, etc.-is enjoined by the law;  it is
not-to-be-done.  And  it  is  not  simply  that  courts  say these  things.  The
identification of the  legal wrong and  the classification of that conduct as a
legal  wrong  are  stated  and  relied  upon  as  the  grounds of the  liability
imposition.  Indeed, even in our post-writ system, a demand for liability in a
complaint must  be  attached to  a count that alleges  that one  or another tort
has  been done,  and a judgment must be linked to a verdict, which  must be
rendered as to a particular tort.
As  to  a  certain  cluster  of positivists,  this  argument  may  not  quite  be
enough.  Thus,  scholars  from  Holmes  to  Hans  Kelsen  to Richard  Posner
might acknowledge  that  tort law categorizes  conduct  into  discrete  wrongs
and conditions  liability  on a determination  as to  whether any such conduct
has occurred.  But, they would argue,  the genuine  legal rules of tort law are
not rules that tell actors  ways  in which they ought  not to behave.  Rather,
the genuine legal rules of tort are directed to the courts, instructing them to
impose liability  where the  conduct  has been  engaged  in  and has  produced
damages. 77  The courts  individually  impose  liability  and infer the liability
imposition  from  a  rule,  but  the  rule  is  a  liability-imposing  rule.  Thus,
according  to the likes of Posner, it does not suffice to establish that tort law
contains  primary  rules  of conduct  merely  to  show  that  tort  conditions
liability on conduct that-as a moral and customary  matter-is regarded as
"wrongful."  There  is  no  separate  body  or  power,  in  this  picture,  that
actually  enjoins  the  conduct,  above  and  beyond  using  its  occurrence  or
nonoccurrence as a condition of liability.  What is missing is the issuance of
a  standing  injunctive  prohibition  of  citizen  conduct,  by  the  sovereign
(through some mechanism).  (Although Austin, the preeminent "command"
theorist,  himself  embraced  the  idea  of  judicial  lawmaking  through  a
delegation from the sovereign, the difficult fit of common law adjudication
into this essentially  legislative conception  of lawmaking  is partly what  led
Holmes to reject Austin's account of common law.)
77.  See id.  at  39-42 (identifying  and responding  to this sort of objection  as to  criminal
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Whether  Hart  personally  was  this  kind  of  positivist,  deep  down,  we
cannot  say.  What we can say, however,  is  that he placed the refutation  of
the command theory of positivism near the top of his philosophical  agenda,
and  that  his  means  of  doing  so  makes  room  for  a  sufficiently  broad
approach to the existence  of legal  rules to permit us to avoid the  foregoing
problem.  Assuming for the moment that Hart believed that the status of the
law  in  a  modern  legal  system  was  dependent  on  compliance  with
conventionally  accepted  secondary  legal  rules  that  typically  used  social
facts as their predicates (even if sometimes drawing upon moral predicates),
the failure of primary rules of conduct that are uttered by courts to be issued
prospectively  as  commands  does  not  disqualify  them  for  law,  on  Hart's
account.  Indeed,  Hart's  rejection  of  this  supposed  entailment  is
characteristic  of his treatment of a  wide variety of legal rules.  And it is in
part the democracy-enshrining  aspect of his  entire theory  that the  status of
law  does  not  depend  on  the  issuance  of  an  imperative  within  a  power
relation  any more  than  it  depends  on  a  connection  with  human nature  or
God's will.  In this respect, Hart's theory  is fundamentally  receptive to the
existence of primary rules of conduct within the common law.
Our concern in this section has been to respond to and refute a set of tort-
centered  objections  to  the  idea  that  a  meaningful  notion  of  obligation
resides at the heart of our tort law.  As  a result we have not focused on the
positive case to be made for a duty-based view of tort,  in part  because  we
have  made  that case  elsewhere. 78  Suffice  it to  say  that,  in our view,  the
interpretive  case for understanding tort law as a law of private wrongs built
on relational  duties of conduct  is overwhelming.  Tort law was understood
to be such  a law by the common  lawyers, by Locke, by Blackstone,  and by
leading early  American  commentators  including  Nathan Dane,  Zephaniah
Swift,  and  Simon  Greenleaf.  The  classic  tort  opinions  that  still  appear
regularly  in American torts casebooks bespeak  a commitment  to this view.
Although  Holmesians  have had  a profound  influence  on the  law of some
states, including, most notably, California, the non-Holmesian view remains
deeply  embedded  in  current  doctrine.79   More  generally,  adopting  a
conception  of  tort  as  a  law  of  wrongs  allows  one  to  see  that  tort,
notwithstanding  all  of  its  complexities,  hangs  together  as  a body  of law
rather than consisting of an ad hoc assemblage of cases driven by individual
judges'  or commentators'  sense of which sorts of decisions promote one or
more of a grab-bag  of policy objectives.  It also allows  one to see why tort
law  has  a distinctive  role to play  in our  legal system, as opposed to being
78.  See supra  note 60 (citing other writings).
79.  See John  C.P. Goldberg  & Benjamin  C.  Zipursky, Shielding Duty:  How Attending
to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve
Judicial Decisionmaking in Negligence  Cases,  79  S.  Cal.  L.  Rev.  329,  329-35  (2006)
(outlining California's approach to duty).
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merely  vestigial.  Finally,  our conception  of tort  identifies  a set  of unique
social  and political  functions  that tort  law  actually  is  designed  to  serve,
which  in turn enables us to ask  and hopefully answer hard questions  about
whether,  in this day  and age,  we still think it important  that a facet of the
legal  system  empower  victims  of conduct  that  is  wrongful  as  to them  to
respond to the perpetrators of such conduct by means of a lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
We have argued in this essay  that mainstream tort scholars'  attraction to
Holmesian jurisprudence  is understandable but ultimately  unmotivated and
wrongheaded.  One  can  share,  as  we  do,  Holmes's  sense  that,
notwithstanding its obvious connections to moral norms, tort law really is a
distinctive enterprise.  One  can also share, as we do, his belief that tort law
is "created"  rather than  found  in  nature,  and  that  its  content  has changed
and  will  continue  to  change  along  with  changes  in  the  economic,
intellectual,  political,  and social  environment  in  which tort operates.  And
yet none of this entails  that tort law  is a  law of liability  rules, or that it is
whatever  judges  say  it  is,  or  that  it  is what  the  occasion  demands.  The
falsity of these sorts of supposed entailments was exactly what Hart set out
to establish  at a general or jurisprudential level.  Thus, we have fastened  on
his response  to  Holmes's theory  of law  as  a way  of articulating  our own
responses  to  Holmesian  accounts  of tort  law.  Tort  law  is  not  a  law  of
liability  rules,  nor  is  it  an  exercise  in  social  engineering.  It  is  a law  of
genuine  duties of conduct.  In this respect, we  are fully on board with Hart
as against Holmes.
In  responding  to  the likes of Holmes  and  Austin, Hart  seemed  to have
been  moved  equally  by  a  desire  to  give  law  more  credit  as  a  partly
autonomous  social practice than did certain  skeptics, and to endow  it  with
less majesty than might a certain kind of natural lawyer.  Our goals are very
much the  same.  We have  sought here  and elsewhere to make sense of tort
law on its own terms, rather than  to reduce it to other terms that some have
supposed to be more "real"  or fundamental,  or to fall back on facile claims
that tort law's  complexities render it incoherent.  And  we have done  so not
to  valorize  tort  law,  but to  provide  a basis  for  making  sound judgments
about which aspects of it are worth keeping and which are not.
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